State v. Hawkins Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38532 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-29-2012
State v. Hawkins Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
38532
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hawkins Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38532" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 497.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/497
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 











REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 1 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY .................................................................................. 2 
L The Court of Appeals' Conclusory Statement 
That "It Is Not Possible To Retroactively Make 
A Determination As To Hawkins' Competency 
At The Time He Was Tried" Is Not "Law Of The Case" ............. 2 
A. Introduction ..................................................................... 2 
B. The State Is Not Precluded By "Law Of 
The Case" From Arguing In This Subsequent 
Appeal That The Court Of Appeals' Statement 
That "It Is Not Possible To Retroactively 
Make A Determination As To Hawkins' Competency 
At The Time He Was Tried" Is Not "Law Of The Case" .. 3 
C. The Court Of Appeals' Statement That "It 
Is Not Possible To Retroactively Make A 
Determination As To Hawkins' Competency 
At The Time He Was Tried" Is Not "Law Of 
The Case" And Does Not Prevent The 
District Court Either From Making A Binding 
Retroactive Competency Determination Or 
From Declining To Order A RetriaL ............................... 10 
D. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Any Alternative 
Grounds For Affirming The District Court's Decision .... 16 
II. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The 
District Court's Retrospective Determination, 
Based On The Facts Developed On Remand, 
That Hawkins Was Competent When He Was 
Tried In 2008 ........................................................................... 18 
A Introduction ................................................................... 18 
B. This Court Should Decline To Adopt A 
Bright-Line Rule That Retrospective 
Competency Determinations, Made More 
Than One Year After The Defendant Was 
Tried, Are Per Se Inadmissible ...................................... 21 
C. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The 
District Court's Retrospective Determination 
That Hawkins Was Competent To Be Tried 
In 2008 ........................................................................... 26 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 32 
II 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 
992 P.2d 751 (1999) .................................................................................. 7 
Capps v. Wood, 1171daho 614, 790 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1990) ....................... ?, 8 
City of Weippe v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 (1974) .............................. 5 
Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162 (101h Cir. 1999) ............................................. 22 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A2d 682 (Pa. 2004) ....................................... 23 
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) .............................................................. 21 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) ..................................................... 21 
Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 794 P.2d 1160 
(Ct.App.1990) ............................................................................. 11, 13,17 
Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176 (ih Cir. 1996) ................................................. 22 
Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1993) .............................. 7 
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) ........................................................... 21 
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) .......................... 23, 25, 26, 30 
Millerv. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1988) ................................................. 25 
Montana v. Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765 (Mont. 1999) .............................................. 23 
Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (91h Cir. 1995) ................................................... 22 
Odie v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084 (91h Cir. 2001) .............................. 22, 24, 25, 30 
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) .............................................................. 21 
People v. Arv, 246 P.3d 322 (Cal. 2011) ............................................................ 24 
Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361, 393 P.2d 585 (1964) ........................................ 5 
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796 (81h Cir. 1996) ....................................... 22, 25, 30 
iii 
State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 239 P.3d 462 (Ct. App. 201 0) ........................... 16 
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009) ............... passim 
State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986) ................................................. 23 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ......................................... 21 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ......................................... 12 
State v. Powers, 961daho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975) ....................................... 21 
State v. Ricks, 134 Idaho 122, 201 P. 827 (1921) ............................................. 12 
State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 40 (W.Va. 2001) .................................................. 23 
State v. Searcy, 120 Idaho 882, 820 P.2d 1239 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 7 
State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832 (La. 1999) ................................................... 25, 30 
State v. VanVlack, 58 Idaho 248, 71 P.2d 1076 (1937) ....................................... 7 
Stuartv. State, 1361daho490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) ............................. 11, 14,16 
Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 
713 P.2d 1374 (1985) ...................................................................... passim 
Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Cooperative, Inc., 
124 Idaho 125, 856 P.2d 1292 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................... passim 
Swanson v. Swanson, 1341daho 512, 5 P.3d 973 (2000) ........................ 4, 11, 17 
Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182 (Ok. 1995) ............................................................ 23 
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009) ............................... passim 
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001) .................................. 23 
United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1988) ........................................... 22 
United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................... 22 
United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) ......................................... 22 
United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1987) ...................................... 22 
iv 
VanTran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................ 22 
Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 23, 24 
Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cri. 1986) ........................................... 21, 22 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-210 ....................................................................................................... 21 
I.C. § 18-211 ................................................................................................. 18, 21 
I.C. § 18-212 ....................................................................................................... 18 
RULES 
I.A.R. 38(c) .......................................................................................................... 16 
v 
ISSUES 
The state's issue statement is set forth at page 5 of the Appellant's brief 
and need not be repeated here. Hawkins raises the following additional issue on 
appeal: 
Did the district court err in making the retrospective determination 
that Mr. Hawkins was competent in January of 2008? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9 (numbering omitted).) 
The state rephrases the additional issue as: 
Has Hawkins failed to show error in the district court's retrospective 
determination, based on the evidence presented to it on remand, that Hawkins 
was competent to stand trial in January 2008? 
1 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. 
The Court of Appeals' Conclusorv Statement That "It Is Not Possible To 
Retroactively Make A Determination As To Hawkins' Competency At The Time 
He Was Tried" Is Not "Law Of The Case" 
A. Introduction 
On appeal from his 2008 conviction for two counts of robbery, Hawkins 
argued that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering an evaluation to 
determine his competency to stand trial and to represent himself in the criminal 
proceedings. State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(review denied 4/29/1 0). (See also #35281 Appellant's brief, pp.17 -25.) 
Following an extensive recitation of the facts and a discussion of the legal 
principles governing the determination of when a trial court must order a 
competency evaluation, the Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Hawkins and 
held: "[T]he district court should have entertained a reasonable doubt about 
Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial or to represent himself. 
Therefore, the district court's failure to sua sponte order a mental evaluation and 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency was an abuse of discretion." 
Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. Then, in a single concluding 
sentence unaccompanied by any analysis or citation to legal authority, the Court 
of Appeals stated: "Because it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must 
vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he 
is found to be competent to stand trial." kL. at 783, 229 P.3d at 388 (footnote 
omitted). The state submits that this concluding sentence in the Court of 
2 
Appeals' opinion is not "law of the case"- and, as such, does not limit the district 
court's authority to make a binding retrospective competency determination -
because the statement was not necessary to resolution of whether the trial court 
should have ordered a competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings, it 
was rendered without analysis or citation to authority, and it is contrary both to 
existing precedent and to the facts that have been developed on remand. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.6-16.) 
In response, Hawkins argues that the state is itself precluded by "law of 
the case" from challenging the Court of Appeals' statement that a retrial is the 
only possible remedy for the trial court's failure to have sua sponte ordered a 
competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings because the state could 
have, but did not, address the issue in the first appeal. (Respondent's brief, 
pp.12-15.) Alternatively, he contends that the Court of Appeals' conclusion that 
he is entitled to a new trial is "law of the case" and, as such, the district court was 
without authority pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine and I.A.R. 38 to do 
anything but order a new trial. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12, 15-19.) For the 
reasons set forth below, Hawkins' arguments fail. 
B. The State Is Not Precluded By "Law Of The Case" From Arguing In This 
Subsequent Appeal That The Court Of Appeals' Statement That "It Is Not 
Possible To Retroactively Make A Determination As To Hawkins' 
Competency At The Time He Was Tried" Is Not "Law Of The Case" 
The state argued in its opening brief that the Court of Appeals' statement 
in Hawkins' prior appeal that "it is not possible to make a retroactive 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" is not "law of 
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the case" and, as such, did not prevent the district court either from making a 
binding retroactive determination of Hawkins' competency in the 2008 
proceedings or from declining to order a retrial. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-16.) In 
response, Hawkins contends that the state "is precluded from now arguing that 
this Court should consider whether Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent in 
January of 2008 because the 'law of the case' doctrine prevents a party from 
relitigating an issue on a subsequent appeal, when it had an earlier opportunity 
to address the same issue, but did not." (Respondent's brief, p.12.) Hawkins' 
waiver argument fails because it is premised on an incorrect characterization of 
the state's arguments in this appeal and, more importantly, it miscomprehends 
the "law of the case" doctrine and its effect on the state's ability to challenge 
whether the remedy proposed by the Court of Appeals in Hawkins' prior appeal 
is actually "law of the case" and therefore binding on the district court. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is essentially a specialized application of 
stare decisis in that it prevents the relitigation of issues finally decided in an 
earlier proceeding in the same action. See, ~. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 
Idaho 512, 516, 5 P.3d 973, 977 (2000) ("[L]ike stare decisis [the law of the case 
doctrine] protects against relitigation of settled issues and assures obedience of 
inferior courts to decisions of superior courts.") (citations, internal quotation 
marks and emphases omitted); Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power 
Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(same). The "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to every statement 
contained in the appellate court's opinion. Rather, as explained by the Idaho 
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Court of Appeals, "[t]he doctrine is well established in Idaho and is limited to the 
appellate court's legal pronouncements and holdings necessary to decide the 
particular issue presented." Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 
P.2d at 1296 (citing Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A, 110 Idaho 15, 
21-22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1985)); see also Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 
709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (When an appellate court "states in its opinion 
a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.") (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516, 5 P.3d at 977 
('The decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes 
precedent to be followed in successive stages of that same litigation."). In other 
words, a statement in an appellate opinion is "law of the case," and therefore 
binding on the lower courts, only if it is a statement of law "necessary to the 
ultimate disposition of the case." Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 
856 P.2d at 1296 (citing Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361, 393 P.2d 585 (1964); 
City of Weippe v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 (1974)). "Otherwise, the 
statement is considered to be dictum and not controlling." Sun Valley Ranches, 
Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1296. 
In this case the state has consistently argued, both in its motion for 
permissive appeal and in its opening brief, that the Court of Appeals' statement 
in Hawkins' prior appeal that "it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" was not a 
5 
statement of law necessary to the appellate court's determination of whether the 
district court erred by not sua sponte ordering Hawkins to undergo a competency 
evaluation in the 2008 trial proceedings and is therefore not "law of the case" 
that prevented the district court on remand from making a binding retrospective 
competency determination. (See Motion For Acceptance Of Appeal By 
Permission And Statement In Support Thereof, pp.8-14; Appellant's brief, pp.6-
16.) Hawkins now contends that the state waived this issue, both by failing in the 
prior appeal to respond to Hawkins' assertion in briefing that a retrial was the 
only appropriate remedy for the trial court's failure to have ordered a competency 
evaluation in the 2008 proceedings, and by not seeking review of the Court of 
Appeals' statement that a retroactive competency determination is not possible. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.11-15.) To support his waiver argument Hawkins 
correctly points out that, in addition to preventing the relitigation of settled issues 
of law, "[t]he 'law of the case' doctrine also prevents consideration on a 
subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised 
in the earlier appeal." (Respondent's brief, p.11 (quoting Taylor, 146 Idaho at 
709, 201 P.3d at 1286) (brackets added, emphasis and footnote omitted); see 
also Respondent's brief, pp.12-13.) Relying on this principle, Hawkins contends 
that, "because the State did not challenge the remedy given by the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2009), it is prevented from 
now doing so under the 'law of the case."' (Respondent's brief, p.15.) Contrary 
to Hawkins' assertions, however, both the facts he cites and the law upon which 
he relies are irreleva~t and do not establish any waiver by the state of the only 
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issue it has raised on appeal - i.e., whether the Court of Appeals' concluding 
statement in Hawkins' prior appeal is or is not "law of the case."1 
There is no question that "law of the case," like res judicata, prevents 
consideration on a second or subsequent appeal of alleged errors that could 
have been raised in the earlier appeal but were not. ~. Taylor, 146 Idaho at 
709, 201 P.3d at 1286 (citing Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 
Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751, 757 (1999); Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 
790 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1990)). Although Hawkins apparently believes that 
the "alleged errors" referred to in this rule include those "which occurred during a 
prior appeal" (Respondent's brief, p.15 (emphasis added)), a review of the 
applicable law shows that such "alleged errors" are actually those '"which arose 
prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier 
appeal,"' Bouten, 133 Idaho at 762, 992 P.2d at 757 (quoting Hawley v. Green, 
124 Idaho 385, 392, 860 P.2d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Searcy, 120 Idaho 882, 820 P.2d 1239 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
Van Vlack, 58 Idaho 248, 71 P.2d 1076 (1937)) ("[A]II alleged errors occurring 
1 Throughout the Respondents' brief, appellate counsel for Hawkins repeatedly 
suggests that the state (and, specifically, undersigned counsel), in an effort to 
deliberately mislead this Court, "affirmatively failed to disclose to this Court the 
complete statement of the law and its own actions" that, appellate counsel 
contends, "foreclose [the state's] current actions." (Respondent's brief, p.15; 
also pp.6, 11-14.) For the reasons set forth herein, however, the facts and law 
cited by Hawkins' appellate counsel and omitted by the state are irrelevant to this 
Court's determination of whether the statement at issue in the Court of Appeals' 
opinion is or is not "law of the case." Any suggestion that the state sought to 
mislead this Court, deliberately or otherwise, is unfounded and, the state 
submits, is based entirely on appellate counsel's own misunderstanding of the 
law and the state's arguments. 
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before the judgment and which errors were or could have been litigated upon the 
appeal from the original judgment will not be considered by an appellate court 
upon a second appeal in the same action."); Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d 
at 399 ("law of the case" doctrine precludes consideration for first time on 
subsequent appeal of "errors which arose prior to the first appeal"). Simply 
stated, this rule discourages piecemeal appeals by requiring parties to raise on 
appeal all issues "embraced by the judgment" from which the appeal arose or 
else forfeit consideration of those issues for all time. Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 
790 P.2d at 399. The rule does not, as suggested by Hawkins, prevent 
consideration for the first time in proceedings following an appeal the question of 
whether a statement actually made by the appellate court on an issue arising 
after judgment but before remand was necessary to the earlier opinion and 
therefore "law of the case." 
Ultimately, the fatal flaw in Hawkins' waiver argument is that it presumes 
every statement in a prior appellate opinion that goes unchallenged becomes 
"law of the case" that binds both the parties and the trial and appellate courts in 
subsequent proceedings in the same action. (See Respondent's brief, p.15 
("[B]ecause the State failed to challenge the alleged errors which occurred during 
a prior appeal, it is foreclosed from raising those claims in the instant appeal.").) 
This presumption is entirely unfounded. As previously explained, it is well 
established in Idaho law that only those legal pronouncements and holdings that 
are "necessary to the ultimate disposition of the case" are "law of the case." Sun 
Valley Ranches. Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1296; see also Taylor, 146 
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Idaho at 709, 201 P.3d at 1286; Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516, 5 P.3d at 977. 
Under this standard, it is irrelevant whether or how strenuously the parties 
litigated the issue; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the statement at issue 
was necessary to the appellate court's decision. To hold, as Hawkins seems to 
suggest, that every statement made by an appellate court becomes "law of the 
case" merely because the parties had an opportunity to litigate it and the 
decision has become final would mean that no statement of an appellate court 
could ever be considered dicta. Clearly, this is not the law. Sun Valley Ranches. 
Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1296 (when an appellate court makes a 
statement that is unnecessary to the ultimate disposition of the case, "the 
statement is considered to be dictum and not controlling"). 
That Hawkins believes the state is precluded by "law of the case" from 
asserting that the Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior 
appeal is not binding on the district court may be due at least in part to Hawkins' 
obvious confusion about what the state is actually arguing on appeal. Hawkins 
contends variously throughout his brief that the state is arguing to this Court that 
it "should consider whether Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent in January 
of 2008" (Respondent's brief, p.12), and that "the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that a retroactive competency determination was not possible in this 
case and that a new trial is the appropriate remedy" (Respondent's brief, p.13 
(citing Appellant's brief, pp.7-11) (emphasis added)). Neither of these assertions 
accurately portrays the state's arguments in this appeal. 
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Nowhere in the state's motion for permissive appeal or in its Appellant's 
brief did the state ask this Court to determine whether Hawkins was actually 
competent to stand trial in January 2008. (See generally Motion For Acceptance 
Of Appeal By Permission; Appellant's brief.) Nor has the state asked this Court 
to overrule any "holding" by the Court of Appeals. (ld.) In fact, the state readily 
confesses that, if the Court of Appeals' statement that "[b]ecause it is not 
possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the 
time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state 
free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial" is a holding, 
both the state and the trial court are bound by such holding and a new trial must 
be conducted. ~. Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 
1296 (legal pronouncements and holdings necessary to disposition of case 
become precedent and must be followed in successive stages of same litigation). 
The state's position, however, is not that the Court of Appeals' erred in so 
holding, but that its statement was not a holding at all under established "law of 
the case" principles and, as such, is not binding on the district court. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-16.) Hawkins has failed to argue, much less demonstrate, that the 
state waived consideration of this argument in these proceedings. 
C. The Court Of Appeals' Statement That "It Is Not Possible To Retroactively 
Make A Determination As To Hawkins' Competency At The Time He Was 
Tried" Is Not "Law Of The Case" And Does Not Prevent The District Court 
Either From Making A Binding Retroactive Competency Determination Or 
From Declining To Order A Retrial 
As discussed both in the state's opening brief and in the preceding 
argument section, the "law of the case" doctrine prevents the relitigation of 
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issues finally decided in an earlier proceeding in the same action. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.7-8; Section I. B., supra.) Specifically, the doctrine provides: 
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a 
case, that rule becomes the law of the case and is controlling both 
in the lower court and on subsequent appeals as long as the facts 
are substantially the same. The decision on an issue of law made 
at one stage of a proceeding becomes precedent to be followed in 
successive stages of that same litigation. [L]ike stare decisis it 
protects against relitigation of settled issues and assures 
obedience of inferior courts to decisions of superior courts. 
Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 516, 5 P.3d 973, 977 (2000) (quoting 
Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 
1990)) (internal quotation marks, citations and emphases omitted). Accord,~. 
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009); Stuart v. 
State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001); Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. 
v. Prairie Power Cooperative. Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ct. 
App. 1993). It is "well established" that the "law of the case" doctrine "is limited 
to the appellate court's legal pronouncements and holdings necessary to decide 
the particular issue presented." Sun Valley Ranches. Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 
P.2d at 1296 (citing Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 
21-22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1985)). Any statement that is not necessary to 
the ultimate disposition of the case "is considered to be dictum and not 
controlling." .!!;h (citations omitted). 
Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case shows 
that the Court of Appeals' statement in Hawkins' prior appeal that "it is not 
possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the 
time he was tried" is not "law of the case." The only issues in Hawkins' prior 
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appeal were "whether in the course of Hawkins' self-representation, the district 
court should have considered sua sponte whether Hawkins was competent to 
undergo trial, and if so, whether Hawkins was rational enough to represent 
himself rather than be represented by counsel." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 
774, 779, 229 P.3d 379, 384 (Ct. App. 2009). The statement at issue was not 
necessary to the resolution of these issues because whether it was possible to 
retroactively determine whether Hawkins was competent at the time he was tried 
in no way informed the Court of Appeals' ultimate determination that the district 
court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation in the first instance. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) Because the statement was not "necessary to decide 
the particular issue presented," the statement is "dictum" and not binding on the 
trial court. Sun Valley Ranches. Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1296 
(citations omitted). 
In response, Hawkins argues that the statement at issue, including the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the state would be "free to retry Hawkins" if he 
is presently competent, must be "law of the case" because "the remedy for an 
error by the district court or the violation of a constitutional right is a necessary 
component to every criminal judicial decision .... " (Appellant's brief, p.16 
(citations omitted).) The state agrees with Hawkins, generally, that when an 
appellate court announces in an opinion a finding of error it must also, as a 
necessary component of the opinion, prescribe a remedy for that error. See 
generally State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) 
(discussing authority of appellate court to remedy errors); State v. Ricks, 134 
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Idaho 122, 125, 201 P. 827, 830 (1921) (citation and internal quotations omitted) 
(role of appellate court is to "review[] the record upon errors properly assigned, 
and reverse and remand cases to be retried only when it is shown that error was 
committed in the former trial"). Upon reviewing the record in Hawkins' prior 
appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred in the 2008 
proceedings by not sua sponte ordering a psychological evaluation to determine 
whether Hawkins was competent to stand trial and, as a remedy for that error, 
the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins' judgment of conviction. Hawkins, 148 
Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. Although the Court of Appeals also expressed its 
view, apparently based on the record before it, that "it is not possible to 
retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he 
was tried," id., there is no indication that the Court of Appeals intended by this 
statement to limit the trial court's discretion to make its own determination in light 
of any new facts developed on remand. See Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516, 5 P.3d 
at 977 (quoting Frazier, 118 Idaho at 106, 794 P.2d at 1162) (rules of law 
announced in appellate decision become "law of the case" and are binding on 
lower court "as long as the facts are substantially the same") (internal quotations 
and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Nor did the Court of Appeals, by 
announcing that the state would be "free to retry" Hawkins if he was presently 
competent, declare as a matter of law that a retrial was the only possible remedy 
for the trial court's error in having failed to order a competency evaluation in the 
2008 proceedings. 
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Contrary to Hawkins' assertions on appeal (see Respondent's brief, 
pp.16-18), the reasoning of Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001), 
is instructive. The facts of Stuart are set forth in detail in the state's opening brief 
(see Appellant's brief, pp.9-11) and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say 
that, in Stuart, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether its statement in 
Stuart's prior appeal- that the state would be "required" on remand to show that 
its surreptitious recordings of confidential conversations between Stuart and his 
attorney "had an origin independent of the eavesdropping" - was "law of the 
case" that prevented the district court from considering the applicability of other 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283. 
The Court ultimately held that it was not, noting that the statement at issue was 
rendered with "little discussion as to why [the Court] chose to state that the State 
had to prove an 'origin independent of the eavesdropping'" and, although there 
was clearly United States Supreme Court precedent discussing the applicability 
of other exceptions - including the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis 
exceptions - the Idaho Supreme Court had "not previously been presented the 
opportunity to examine [those] exceptions and determine their applicability in 
Idaho." .!.9.:. There being "no case law from [the Idaho Supreme Court] on the 
subject" the Court declined to presume that its single conclusory statement in 
Stuart's prior appeal- that the state would be "required" on remand to prove an 
independent origin - actually "decided that the inevitable discovery and 
attenuated basis exceptions should not be applied in Idaho." .!.9.:. 
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The reasoning of Stuart is equally applicable to the facts of this case and 
compels the conclusion that the Court of Appeals' statement in Hawkins' prior 
appeal - that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to 
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" and the state is "free to retry" 
Hawkins - is not "law of the case." As in Stuart, the statement at issue in this 
case was rendered with "little discussion" and, in fact, appears in a single 
concluding sentence of the Court of Appeals' opinion, unaccompanied by any 
analysis or citation to authority. As set forth both in the state's opening brief and 
in argument section Ill, below, although Idaho's appellate courts have never 
before considered the issue, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions holds 
that retroactive competency determinations are possible in appropriate 
circumstances. (See Appellant's brief, pp.11-13 (and cases cited therein); 
Section Ill, infra.) To suggest, as does Hawkins, that the Court of Appeals 
intended its conclusory statement to bind the district court in this case from 
making a retrospective competency determination as a matter of law, when the 
propriety of such determinations is a question of first impression in Idaho, reads 
too much into the Court of Appeals' opinion. Consistent with the reasoning of 
Stuart, this Court should decline to presume that the Court of Appeals' single, 
concluding and unsupported statement in Hawkins' prior appeal actually decided 
the legal question of whether retroactive competency determinations are 
permissible in Idaho. The statement is dictum, not "law of the case," and does 
not prevent the district court from making a binding retroactive competency 
determination. 
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D. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Any Alternative Grounds For Affirming The 
District Court's Decision 
The district court concluded it was constrained by "law of the case" from 
making a binding retroactive determination of Hawkins' competency to stand trial 
in the 2008 proceedings. The district court erred. Under established principles 
of law, including the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Stuart v. State, 136 
Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001), the Court of Appeals' statement in Hawkins' 
prior appeal that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to 
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" is dictum and, as such, is not 
binding on the trial court. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-16; Section II.C., supra.) 
On appeal Hawkins. presents two alternative grounds upon which he 
asserts the district court's order for a retrial must be affirmed. First, he contends 
that, "pursuant to I.A.R. 38, the district court only had the authority to order a new 
trial." (Respondent's brief, p.11 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) 
Second, he contends that, because the Court of Appeals vacated his 
convictions, the district court lacks jurisdiction to re-enter judgment without a new 
finding or admission of guilt. (Respondent's brief, p.17.) Neither of Hawkins' 
arguments has merit. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c) requires a trial court, upon receiving a 
remittitur issued upon a final appellate opinion, to "forthwith comply with the 
directive of the opinion." I.A.R. 38(c); State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 667, 239 
P.3d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2010). Hawkins contends that, pursuant to this rule, the 
district court was required on remand to comply with the Court of Appeals' 
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"directive" in State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009), 
and grant Hawkins a new a trial. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-12.) The flaw in 
Hawkins' argument, however, is that it begs the question of whether the Court of 
Appeals' statement in Hawkins' prior appeal - that a retroactive competency 
determination is not possible and Hawkins may be retried if he is presently 
competent - is in fact a controlling "directive" or, as the state contends, merely 
dictum that did not bind the district court to order a retrial. Rule 38 is, in effect, 
nothing more than a codification of the "law of the case" doctrine in that it 
requires "obedience of inferior courts to decisions of superior courts." Swanson 
v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 516, 5 P.3d 973, 977 (2000) (quoting Frazier v. 
Neilsen & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1990)) 
(internal quotation marks, citations and emphases omitted). Because, for the 
reasons already stated, the Court of Appeals' statement is not a controlling 
directive but is instead non-binding dictum, the trial court was not required, either 
by "law of the case" or by I.A.R. 38, to order a new trial. 
As a second proposed alternative basis for affirming the district court's 
order granting him a new trial, Hawkins posits: 
Even if we ignore the plain language that a retroactive 
competence determination 'is not possible' in this case, and we 
assume that the intent of the Court of Appeals was to remand for a 
retroactive competency hearing, the district court would still have 
no jurisdiction to re-impose the conviction without a guilty plea or 
finding of guilt by a jury. 
(Respondent's brief, p.17 (citations omitted); see also p.19 ("[TJhe Court of 
Appeals vacated Mr. Hawkins' convictions. So even if it was permissible for the 
district court to attempt to determine Mr. Hawkins' competency in January 2008, 
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it would still be required to give him a new trial.").) This argument fails because it 
ignores the fact that, while the Court of Appeals vacated "the judgment of 
conviction," see Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388, it did not disturb 
the jury verdicts finding Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery. Because there 
is already an undisturbed jury finding of guilt, nothing would preclude the district 
court from re-entering judgment on that finding, as long as the court determined 
that the finding was obtained while Hawkins was mentally competent to be tried. 
See l!;l (vacating judgment of conviction on sole ground that trial court failed to 
employ adequate procedures to ensure that Hawkins was competent to stand 
trial). Hawkins has failed to show any alternative grounds for affirming the 
district court's order granting him a new triaL 
II. 
Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retrospective 
Determination, Based On The Facts Developed On Remand. That Hawkins Was 
Competent When He Was Tried In 2008 
A Introduction 
After the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins' convictions and remanded 
the case to the district court, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a 
competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212. (R., pp.29-30, 
34-36, 39.) Hawkins was evaluated by two different mental health professionals, 
licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael 
Estess. (11/12/10 Tr., p.9, L.14- p.12, L.15, p.59, L.22- p.60, L.18, p.67, L.18 
- p.68, L.19; State's Exhibits 5 and 6.) At an evidentiary hearing on the 
competency issue, both doctors opined, based on their interactions with 
18 
Hawkins, his responses to testing, and other collateral information regarding 
Hawkins' social and institutional history, that Hawkins is competent to stand trial. 
(11 /12/10 Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20- p.95, L.3.) 
Specifically, Dr. Sombke testified that Hawkins is neither delusional nor 
psychotic; he is competent, understands the proceedings against him and is 
capable of assisting in his own defense. (11/12/10 Tr., p.28, L.16- p.46, L.5, 
p.53, L.2 - p.56, L.13.) Dr. Estess likewise testified that Hawkins is "perfectly 
competent" to stand trial, that "he is not psychotic and not delusional," and that 
there is "nothing about him ... that would preclude his ability to confer with his 
attorney in his own defense or to understand the nature and circumstances of his 
legal difficulties." (11/12/10 Tr., p.91, L.24- p.95, L.3.) 
Dr. Estess further testified that he and his staff had numerous prior 
contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was housed in the Ada 
County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.25.) 
Between 2006 and 2008, neither Dr. Estess, his staff, nor jail staff believed that 
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. (11/12/10 Tr., p.64, L.14 - p.67, 
L.17.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "arrogant[,] narcissi[stic], paranoid, 
inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial ... angry, petulant, manipulative, 
deceitful, and dishonest, and coy." (11/12/10 Tr., p.65, Ls.16-22.) He opined, 
however, that at the time he was tried in January 2008, Hawkins "was perfectly 
competent to understand the nature of the proceedings, to confer with an 
attorney in his own defense and understand what was going on. ... [B]asically, 
... he was competent to stand trial." (11/12/10 Tr., pp.99, L.18- p.100, L.19.) 
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Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the 
district court found that Hawkins "is able to assist in his own defense and is 
capable of understanding [the] nature of the proceedings" and is therefore 
presently competent to stand trial. (R., p.135.) The court also found by clear 
and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood the nature of the proceedings 
against him and was able to assist in his own defense at the time he went to trial 
in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made the retroactive finding that 
Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. (R., pp.135-36.) 
On appeal, Hawkins argues that "the district court erred in determining 
that [he] was retrospectively competent throughout his trial in January of 2008." 
(Respondent's brief, p.20 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) Hawkins 
recognizes that courts in other jurisdictions have held retrospective competency 
determinations are permissible in certain circumstances. (Respondent's brief, 
p.24.) Nevertheless, he asks this Court to find, as a matter of first impression in 
Idaho, that retrospective competency determinations made more than one year 
after trial do not comport with due process and are therefore impermissible as a 
matter of law. (Respondent's brief, pp.22-23.) Alternatively, he contends that a 
retroactive determination of his competency to stand trial in 2008 is not possible 
"based on the circumstances and facts presented in his case." (Respondent's 
brief, p.24.) Neither argument withstands scrutiny when viewed in light of the 
weight of relevant authority and the facts of this case. 
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B. This Court Should Decline To Adopt A Bright-Line Rule That 
Retrospective Competency Determinations. Made More Than One Year 
After The Defendant Was Tried. Are Per Se Inadmissible 
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not 
mentally competent to stand trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70 
(2008). Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 
U.S. 375, 385 (1966); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287 
(2003). Under a due process analysis, the test for determining competency is 
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Accord Edwards, 554 U.S. at 170; Drope, 
420 U.S. at 172; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287; State v. Powers, 96 
Idaho 833, 843, 537 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1975). In Idaho, the right of a defendant 
to be free from prosecution while mentally incompetent is safeguarded by I.C. §§ 
18-210 and 18-211 which, together, require the trial court to order a competency 
evaluation whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's "capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense." 
"[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's 
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of 
his due process right to a fair trial." Drope, 362 U.S. at 172 (citing Pate, 383 U.S. 
375). If such a violation occurs, the question becomes whether an adequate 
hearing can be held to determine the defendant's competency at the time of his 
trial. Drope, 362 U.S. at 183; Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 630 (5th Cri. 
21 
1986). Idaho's appellate courts have never considered whether such 
retrospective competency determinations are permissible. However, numerous 
other courts have considered the issue and have held that such determinations 
"are permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate 
retrospectively the competency of the defendant." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 
690, 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted}, superseded Qy statute on other 
grounds as stated in VanTran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 
United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1250 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Odie 
v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court's failure to hold a 
competency hearing at the time of trial can be cured by holding a retrospective 
competency hearing "when the record contains sufficient information upon which 
to base a reasonable psychiatric judgment")); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 
872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he district court is in the best position to determine 
whether it can make a retrospective determination of competency."); United 
States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767-68 (3rd Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. 
Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (upholding 
retroactive competency determination where the evidence allowed for a 
meaningful retrospective hearing and established defendant's competence at the 
time of trial); Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176, 1180-82 (ih Cir. 1996) (same); 
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996) (meaningful retroactive 
competency determination possible where "the state of the record, together with 
such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate 
assessment of the defendant's condition at the time"); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 
22 
F.3d 1162, 1168-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 
1286-87 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) ("nunc pro tunc competency hearing [possible], so 
long as a reliable inquiry into the defendant's competency can still be made"); 
accord Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001 ); State v. 
Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184-85 (Wis. 1986); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 
40, 53-55 (W.Va. 2001 }; Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 
2004); Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Ok. 1995); Montana v. Bostwick, 988 
P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999). 
Hawkins recognizes that "some courts have held that a retrospective 
competency determination is 'permissible when a court can conduct a 
meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the 
defendant.'" (Respondent's brief, p.24 (citing McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 
946, 962 (101h Cir. 2001).) Nevertheless, he asks this Court to hold that 
retroactive competency determinations made more than one year after the 
defendant was tried are inadequate, as a matter of law, to satisfy the 
requirements of due process. (Respondent's brief, pp.22-23.) In support of his 
argument, Hawkins relies on Dusky, Pate and Drope, supra, noting that, in each 
case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the inherent difficulties 
associated with retrospectively determining a defendant's competence and, in 
each case, the Court declined to remand for a retrospective competency 
determination more than one year after the defendant had been tried. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.22-23.) 
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Hawkins' reliance on Dusky, Pate and Drope for a bright-line rule 
prohibiting retrospective competency determinations due the passage of time is 
misplaced. None of those cases hold that such determinations are impossible. 
In fact, the state is unaware of any case, and Hawkins has cited none, that has 
interpreted the Supreme Court's opinions in Dusky, Pate and Drope as holding 
that retrospective competency determinations, made more than one year after 
the defendant was tried, are impermissible as a matter of law. Rather, as set 
forth above, courts that have considered the issue nearly universally hold that, 
while such determinations may be difficult, they are permissible when the trial 
court has sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the 
defendant's competency at the time he or she was tried. See, ~. Odie, 238 
F.3d at 1089-90 (passage of "many years since Odie was convicted" did not 
preclude trial court from making retrospective competency determination based 
on "old and new evidence" pertaining directly to Odie's competency at the time 
he was tried); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (Fifth Circuit, though "acutely aware of the 
hazards connected with retrospective competency hearings," nevertheless "has 
repeatedly sanctioned nunc pro tunc proceedings where there is sufficient data 
available to guarantee reliability") (citations omitted); People v. Arv, 246 P.3d 
322, 329 (Cal. 2011) (and cases cited therein) ("majority of courts that have 
considered this issue agree" that failure to hold a competency hearing at the time 
of trial can be cured retroactively). 
Whether a trial court can conduct a meaningful and reliable retrospective 
competency hearing is best assessed on a case-by-case basis, not as a matter 
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of law. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Miller v. Dugger, 
838 F.2d 1530 (11 1h Cir. 1988)). The passage of time since the defendant's 
conviction, though relevant, "is not an insurmountable obstacle if sufficient 
contemporaneous information is available" and "permits an accurate assessment 
of the defendant's condition at the time of the original state proceedings." 
Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855 (citing Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (8th Cir. 
1996)); see also Odie, 238 F. 3d at 1089-90. Factors bearing on whether a 
meaningful retrospective competency determination is possible include, but are 
not limited to, "the existence of contemporaneous medical evidence, the 
recollections of non-experts who had the opportunity to interact with the 
defendant during the relevant period, statements by the defendant in the trial 
transcript, and the existence of medical records." Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855; see 
also McGregor, 248 F.3d at 962-63 (listing similar factors and passage of time as 
relevant considerations in assessment of whether retrospective competency 
determination is possible). Ultimately, it is the trial court who is in the best 
position to determine whether the evidence before it permits a meaningful 
retrospective determination of the defendant's competence to stand trial. kL 
(citing Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 767). 
Hawkins asks this Court to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting retrospective 
competency determinations in cases where it has been more than one year 
since the defendant was tried, but he has not cited any authority for the 
proposition that such determinations are per se impermissible; and, as 
demonstrated above, the weight of authority actually suggests the opposite. 
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Because the question of whether such determinations are possible will 
necessarily depend on the facts of each case, this Court should reject Hawkins' 
invitation to adopt a bright-line rule and instead hold, consistent with prevailing 
authority, that such determinations are permissible whenever the trial court has 
sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the defendant's 
competency at the time of trial. 
C. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retrospective 
Determination That Hawkins Was Competent To Be Tried In 2008 
As an alternative to his argument that retrospective competency 
determinations made more than one year after trial are impermissible as a 
matter of law, Hawkins asks this Court to find that such a determination is not 
possible based on the facts and circumstances of this case. (Respondent's 
brief, pp.24-25.) Hawkins recognizes that courts consider a number of factors in 
determining whether a retrospective competency determination is possible in any 
particular case. (Respondent's brief, p.24 (citing McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 
946, 962-63 (1oth Cir. 2001) (and factors cited therein- including (1) passage of 
time, (2) availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, (3) statements by 
defendant in trial record, and (4) availability of individuals who were in position to 
interact with defendant before and during trial).) However, with the exception of 
the passage of time, Hawkins utterly ignores those factors and the evidence on 
remand that supports the district court's retroactive finding that Hawkins was 
competent when he was tried in January 2008. 
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After the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins' convictions, Hawkins was 
evaluated by two mental health experts, both of whom testified at a January 
201 0 competency hearing that Hawkins was then presently competent to be 
tried. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.16, L.6- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2- p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20- p.95, 
L.3.) Dr. Sombke had originally opined that Hawkins was delusional (11/12/10 
Tr., p.19, L.16 - p.20, L.13; State's Exhibit 6), but he changed his opinion after 
reviewing a wealth of collateral information that was not available to him when he 
made his initial diagnosis (11/12/10 Tr., p.20, L.14 - p.29, L.10). Included 
among that information were letters Hawkins had written to his parents while in 
jail, a report on Hawkins' psychological condition prepared by Dr. Michael 
Johnston in March 2008, and a 2006 psychological evaluation of Hawkins' wife, 
Darcy. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.20, L.14 - p.28, L.15; State's Exhibits 1, 3, 4.) After 
reviewing that information, all of which was admitted at the 2011 competency 
hearing, and conferring with Dr. Estess, Dr. Sombke concluded that Hawkins has 
"always had" the capacity to understand the proceedings against him (11/12/1 0 
Tr., p.29, L.11-16), and that "he has the capacity to participate meaningfully in 
his defense with an attorney" but "he just choses [sic] not to do that" (11/12/10 
Tr., p.29, L.17- p.30, L.14). Dr. Sombke explained that, in his view, the "main 
issue" he had to decide was whether Hawkins was delusional. (11/12/1 0 Tr., 
p.30, Ls.19-22.) While Hawkins initially presented to Dr. Sombke as delusional 
based on Hawkins' insistence that he was affiliated with and committed his 
crimes at the direction of covert governmental agencies, that portrayal was 
ultimately not borne out by any of the collateral information Dr. Sombke 
27 
reviewed. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.32, L.5, p.33, L.2 - p.35, L.5.) Dr. 
Sombke explained: 
[l]f somebody holds a delusion for that fixed and for that period of 
time, where he says it's been 20 years or more, that delusion would 
permeate his life throughout all segments of his life, where it 
wouldn't be just compartmentalized right when he talks in court or 
whatever. It would be part of his life. 
And reviewing the collateral information from the prison and 
the other evaluations I saw, I saw almost no references to the 
C.I.A., the D.I.A., or government agencies. It wasn't present in 
what Mr. Hawkins was telling other people. So it was just - it was 
just not consistent with the true delusional disorder that would have 
been in those other conversations. 
He changed his story a lot in the other information that I was 
-the collateral information. There was a lot of changes about his 
stories, with his history, and with his wife, and all that. 
And all that information leads me to believe that he's not 
delusional. And I think a lot of this stuff are stories that he is just 
telling people to try to benefit his current situation. 
(11/12/1 0 Tr., p.31, L.6 - p.32, L.5.) Ultimately, Dr. Sombke characterized 
Hawkins as manipulative and potentially obsessive-compulsive (11/12/1 0 Tr., 
p.32, Ls.6-8, p.34, L.8 - p.35, L.5); but he opined that Hawkins is neither 
delusional nor psychotic (11/12/10 Tr., p.37, L.4- p.38, L.15) and is competent 
to stand trial (11/12/10 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-10). 
Dr. Estess also evaluated Hawkins' competency and, in doing so, 
reviewed much of the same collateral information relied on by Dr. Sombke. 
(11/12/1 0 Tr., p.67, L.18 - p.72, L.2; State's Exhibit 5.) Unlike Dr. Sombke, 
however, Dr. Estess was already familiar with Hawkins because he and his staff 
had numerous prior contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was 
housed in the Ada County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.62, L.8 
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- p.63, L.25.) Between 2006 and 2008, Dr. Estess had many discussions with 
his staff and the jail security officers about Hawkins' mental condition. (11/12/1 0 
Tr., p.63, Ls.19-25.) Dr. Estess prescribed Prozac to Hawkins for depression, 
but Hawkins did not require any other mental health treatment, and neither Dr. 
Estess nor his staff nor jail staff believed that Hawkins suffered from any mental 
illness at the time. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.64, L.1 - p.65, L.4, p.67, Ls.6-12.) Dr. 
Estess characterized Hawkins as "a very arrogant narcissi, paranoid, inadequate, 
dependent, dishonest, antisocial character. And an angry, petulant, 
manipulative, deceitful, and dishonest and coy - thinks more of his intelligence 
than he has, and presents himself in that smart-aleck kind of sarcastic, pseudo 
fashion." (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.65, Ls.16-22; see also p.67, Ls.6-1 0 ("[E]veryone 
came to the conclusion about when they interacted with Mr. Hawkins is that he 
was a manipulative, dishonest, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid character who 
was not mentally ill.").) Based on his prior interactions with Hawkins and his 
comprehensive review of other information bearing on Hawkins' competency -
including the trial transcripts and information pertaining to Hawkins' prior social, 
institutional and mental health history (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.70, L.5- p.72, L.2, p.74, 
L.8 - p.75, L.21) - Dr. Estess opined "to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty" that Hawkins was not only presently competent at the time of the 
January2011 competency hearing (11/12/10Tr., p.91, L.24-p.92, L.19), but he 
was also "perfectly competent" when he stood trial in January 2008 (11/12/10 
Tr., p.99, L.18- p.100, L.13). 
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Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the 
district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood 
the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own 
defense at the time he went to trial in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made 
the retroactive finding that Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. (R., 
pp.135-36.) Hawkins does not directly challenge the district court's finding, or 
any of the evidence on which it was based, but instead argues only that the 
passage of 34 months between his trial and the district court's retrospective 
competency determination "is too long for a retrospective competence 
evaluation, especially considering the static [sic] nature of mental illness." 
(Respondent's brief, p.25.) Hawkins' argument is just a reiteration of his claim 
that, because retroactive competency determinations made more than one year 
after a defendant has been tried are difficult, such determinations are 
impermissible. (Compare Respondent's brief, pp.22-23 with pp.24-25.) This 
argument fails for the reasons already set forth in Section II.B., supra, and 
Hawkins has otherwise failed to show any error by the district court. 
As previously explained, the passage of time since a defendant's 
conviction "is not an insurmountable obstacle" to a retrospective competency 
determination so long as "sufficient contemporaneous information is available" to 
permit an reliable assessment of the defendant's mental condition at the time of 
trial. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Reynolds v. Norris, 
86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (81h Cir. 1996)); see also Odie, 238 F.3d at 1089-90. The 
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information available to the district court in this case included contemporaneous 
medical evidence - including a March 2008 psychological evaluation (State's 
Exhibit 3) - the trial transcript, and the observations and opinions of two mental 
health experts, one of whom was in a position to interact with Hawkins before 
and during his 2008 trial. See, SUL_, McGregor, 248 F.3d at 962-63 (factors to be 
considered in retrospective competency determination include availability of 
contemporaneous medical evidence, statements by defendant in trial record, and 
availability of individuals who were in position to interact with defendant before 
and during trial). It should also be noted that the district judge who made the 
retrospective competency determination is the same judge who presided over 
Hawkins' trial and who observed then that it had never had cause to believe that 
Hawkins lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in 
his own defense. (#35281 Trial Tr., p.1120, L.15 - p.1121, L2.) Taken 
together, this information was sufficient to support the district court's retroactive 
determination that Hawkins was mentally competent during his 2008 trial. 




The state respectfully requests that this Court (1) reverse that portion of 
the district court's December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's Competence 
in which the district court found it was prevented by "law of the case" from 
making a binding retrospective determination of Hawkins' competence to stand 
trial, (2) affirm the district court's retrospective finding that Hawkins was 
competent during the 2008 trial, and (3) remand for the re-entry of judgment on 
the jury verdicts finding Hawkins guilty of two counts of robbery. 
DATED this 291h day of May 2012. 
~~Q~ 
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